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Editor’s note: Warner’s essay on ‘Man’s Moral Law’ was her contribution 
to Man, Proud Man: A Commentary, edited by Mabel Ulrich (London: 
Hamish Hamilton, 1932). The essays in the volume all took the form of 
a title that opens up a gap between the human and the masculine: ‘Man 
the Master. An Illusion’ (Mary Borden), ‘Man and Personal Relations’ 
(E. M. Delafield), ‘Man as Pleasure-seeker’ (Susan Ertz), ‘Man the 
Helpmate’ (Storm Jameson), ‘Man the Magpie’ (Helen Simpson), ‘Man – 
Without Prejudice’ (G. B. Stern), ‘Man’s Moral Law’ (Warner) and ‘Man 
and Religion’ (Rebecca West).
The philosopher Kant, celebrated for having written the Critique of Pure 
Reason and practising so exemplary a punctuality that the citizens of 
Jena set their clocks by his afternoon walk, gave it as his considered 
opinion that there were two things that beat him, or, as the English 
translation of this saying more elegantly puts it: 
filled his soul with awe; 
The starry heavens and man’s moral law. 
Since Kant’s day the starry heavens have lost a good deal of their 
aloofness. In fact, they may be said to have become a Palm Beach of 
the intellect. The nebulae in Andromeda are now within the grasp of 
quite modest ambitions, and the meanest diner-out can speak of express 
trains proceeding intermittently through time-space with the authority 
of a Bradshaw. Also, telescopes have been considerably improved. But 
the subject of Man’s Moral Law is still as imposing a mystery as it was 
when it baffled Kant. Science, so brisk and dauntless in her dealings 
elsewhere, trembles here, and veils her face. Research drops the scalpel, 
even women, said to be so inquisitive, lapse into silent wonderment 
before this massive phenomenon and have learned by experience to 
provoke its manifestations as little as possible. 
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Non ragionam di lor. Guardate e passa.1
From many points of view this reverence is admirable. History and 
fable combine to enforce upon us the teaching that it is not good for us to 
know everything. As Sir George Beaumont demanded the brown tree in 
the landscape, the human mind instinctively craves for one point of dusk 
and repose, one door that may not be opened, one branch whose fruit may 
never be plucked. Such considerations rushed into my mind when I was 
first requested by the Editor of this Symposium to undertake an investiga-
tion into this aspect of the male of the human species. Why, thought I, 
seek to lay the axe to the root of this brown tree, why invade this privacy, 
why imperil the majestic shade which for so long has brooded over this 
unknown? In a world where so little romance is left, where every ultima 
thule of the imagination has been mapped and charted and where the 
bison is fast becoming extinct, would it not be better to leave Man’s Moral 
Law alone? And for a moment I experienced an abashed awe such as I 
used to feel as a child when my nurse would point to a local gas-container 
and tell me that if I were ever so wicked as to stick a pin into that vast 
cylindrical bulk painted a threatening crimson, an instant explosion would 
hurl me and the neighbourhood to disintegration. 
If action is the only test of assertion, then for all I know my nurse 
was right; for I have never stuck a pin into that gas-vat or any other. 
Nevertheless, so I argued with myself, I do not now believe in the 
correctness of her statement, and people better qualified to speak with 
authority in this matter have since assured me that she was talking 
arrant nonsense. But how to know, so urged the more speculative 
and superstitious part of my mind, that this statement of hers, though 
actually erroneous, was not mystically true, and sent as a warning? 
And again it seemed to me that I had better stay my hand, and content 
myself with the awe which was good enough for Kant, and should 
surely be good enough for me. For suppose — and now my super-
rational self began to talk with the utmost loudness and  plausibility — 
suppose that Man’s Moral Law were indeed what my nurse’s theory of 
gas-vats so grossly boded forth, and might, at one unadvised and sacri-
legious prod, explode, and bring about the  disintegration of society. 
Where should I be then, meddlesome creature? 
To cut a long story short, I said that Man’s Moral Law was a subject 
which had always interested me, and that I should be very glad to 
undertake an enquiry into it. 
Before I begin an account of my enquiry a word or two should 
be said as to my qualifications. In these days of specialization the 
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empirical method is rightly suspect, and some may wonder at me for 
my readiness to attack a question of which I have already confessed 
my ignorance. But Man’s Moral Law is perhaps the only subject left 
to us which may be approached with any hope of profit from a datum 
line of incompetence. Before so dense a mystery one eye may be as 
good as another, and the very fact of knowing nothing may condition a 
valuable freedom from bias. 
It is only in the strictest sense of the word, moreover, that one can 
say one knows nothing of Man’s Moral Law. Of its origin, its constituents, 
its chemistry and dynamics we are indeed ignorant; but it is scarcely 
possible to spend an hour in the company of man without being made 
aware that it exists and functions, and that it is, most emphatically, a 
force. Our position in this respect is much the same as the position of 
humankind before the discovery of electricity. Though no one could say 
what caused the lightning, the lightning was there, sometimes latent, 
sometimes leaping from a cloud, a thing to be dreaded, admired, and 
if possible avoided. Certain conditions of weather, so experience would 
teach, a sultriness in the air, a certain bulginess and discoloration in 
the clouds, heralded its appearance; and in a similar way we know by 
experience that certain physical aspects of man, an appearance of slight 
inflation, a special tense quality in his silences, prelude the manifesta-
tions, more or less devastating but always impressive, of his Moral Law. 
To establish a connection between the lightning flash and the peculiar 
properties that could be elicited from amber by briskly rubbing it with 
a woollen stocking would seem, did we not know that it had been 
done, a task beyond human ingenuity. Yet little by little, by research, 
observation, and experiment, the task was accomplished; and there 
seems to be no absolute reason why an application of the same methods 
may not end in the disclosure of the nature or Man’s Moral Law. 
Indeed, upon some counts, Man’s Moral Law seems a more promising 
subject than electricity, which in its major demonstration of lightning 
is too swift and intermittent a phenomenon to afford a satisfactory 
subject for research. And though a too rash exploration into the former 
may provoke alarming reactions, the actual danger to life and limb 
is probably less than that which attends experiments with lightning. 
Lastly, though this may seem almost too fantastic a consideration for 
mention, last year, 1931, saw the centenary of the birth of Faraday; and 
since Man’s Moral Law must be looked into some time or another, one 
could not begin one’s investigations in a year of better augury.
We have learned from Freud what rich results may be gained 
from an examination of traditional idioms, idioms that have become 
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so much a part of common speech that their import passes unnoticed. 
I propose to base the first part of my examination of Man’s Moral Law 
upon three such common phrases. The first or these is the expression, 
Playing the game; the second, the often-heard reproach, It’s not cricket; 
the third the exclamation, always used in a slighting or belittling sense, 
Skittles! or, That’s all skittles. This may seem an arbitrary choice. But in 
the prolegomena of so virgin a subject one must begin somewhere; and 
I hope that I may presently show that the choice is not quite so arbitrary 
as at first sight it may seem. 
Let us first observe what these phrases have in common. It will be 
seen that while (a) they are all based upon pastimes, they all (b) convey 
a moral judgement; and (c) they are all masculine phrases. Should it 
be objected against this last statement that women may and frequently 
do use these phrases with exactly the same connotation and emphasis 
as they bear in the mouths of men, I must bring forward the counter-
objection that women have produced no equivalent phrases drawn 
from the specific interests and occupations of femininity. It is absurd 
to suppose that Penelope or Lucretia would condemn a lapse from 
conjugal fidelity with the expression, It’s not needlework; and though 
cookery has supplied the term of reproach, half-baked, this is used as 
a plain metaphor of semi-imbecility, and conveys none of the earnest 
moral censure inseparable from the male phrases above. 
We now arrive at the consideration of the first common quality 
of these three phrases, their origin in pastimes. It may seem at first 
sight peculiar that the moral judgements implicit in them should be 
vested in a terminology proper to games, and that so serious a matter 
as the reprobation of vice or ill-timed frivolity should be thus connected 
with activities which their very generic name of pastimes announces 
as a method of whiling away an otherwise negligible and unoccupied 
duration of time. Why, one might ask, arguing upon a purely ration-
alistic basis, should the conduct of one who betrays a trust, sets fire 
to his neighbour’s hayrick, or puts poison in the children’s milk, be 
condemned by the statement that it is not a highly organized method of 
passing the time which demands for its full execution twelve variously-
formed pieces of wood, a small leather sphere, and two opposing bands 
of players, each band consisting of eleven participants and a twelfth 
man in case of accidents, together, should the rite be performed in its 
most perfect form, with two umpires, and a large expanse of smooth 
and levelled grass with defined boundaries? Apart from the poetical 
excitement inseparable from the use of metaphor, would it not be 
actually more emphatic, more condemnatory, to say of such behaviour, 
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It is treachery, It is arson, It is murder? — in the two latter instances 
offences which involve severe punishment by legal code. 
Yet a small amount of reflection will show an overwhelming 
speech-tendency to apply terms proper to pastimes to the graver 
aspects of life, and always with an implied moral overtone. And further 
examination will show that the preponderance of these terms are drawn 
from games predominantly or exclusively masculine. In England cricket 
and football, in the United States baseball, supply a rich harvest of such 
terms; tennis supplies fewer; croquet —a female game — and lacrosse, 
none. 
In this connection it will be of interest to examine the variations 
of sense in the word sporting. To be sporting or Not sporting are terms 
which now rival To be cricket or Not cricket in their implications of 
moral worth or unworth. But it is only of recent years, comparatively 
speaking, that sporting has come to bear this moral overtone; and it is in 
the same lapse of time that its use has been transferred almost entirely 
from the blood to the bloodless sports. In the days of our grandparents 
to be sporting meant to be given to shooting, fishing, or hunting. Good 
sport expressed either an opinion that an adequate number of grouse, 
salmon, hares, foxes, etc., had been killed, or a friendly aspiration 
that it might be so. Now this sense of the word has been practically 
supplanted by a secondary meaning in which it expresses a favourable 
moral judgement upon character or actions quite unconnected with the 
ability to sit a horse, reel in a salmon or bring down a pheasant with 
either barrel. 
This bleaching, as one might express it, of the word sport and 
its derivatives — this transference from blood to bloodless sports by 
which it acquires at the same time a connotation of moral excellence — 
might suggest to some hasty humanitarian that the moral overtone 
implies approbation of harmlessness. Recollection, however, of the high 
accident rate in football and baseball — games profoundly embroiled 
in the sports-morality compound — should be enough to warn one off 
from following this specious hypothesis. Illumination must be sought 
elsewhere; and for that illumination we must turn to the third phrase of 
my three examples: the exclamation, Skittles. 
It is at once evident that common usage has established an 
antithesis, as it were, between cricket and skittles. Morally speaking, 
whatever is skittles isn’t cricket, whatever is cricket isn’t skittles. Skittles 
is something light, negligible, despicably easy, calling out none of the 
better nature of man. A life that is All beer and skittles, however alluring 
such a life might sound, is in sum worthless and morally insignificant. 
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Cricket, on the other hand, is serious, strenuous, laudable. It is in the 
antithesis between these two games, both alike originally devised as 
pastimes, and both based on the common principle of knocking down 
one object with another, that we must seek the clue. What quality is it, 
present in the one, lacking in the other, that gives rise to their opposed 
moral significances, and elicits this responsive gush from the mysterious 
hidden fountain of Man’s Moral Law? 
The difference is not far to seek. The merest tyro, the most 
inattentive looker-on at a game of cricket, is aware that cricket is a 
game with a great number of rules. Skittles, on the other hand, is only 
surpassed by rounders for lawlessness. 
It seems clear, then, that it is by the absence or presence of their 
rules that we may expect to find games linked up with Man’s Moral 
Law. And there is striking corroborative evidence for this conclusion 
in the moral import or overtone taken on by the word sporting as it is 
transferred from the blood to the bloodless sports. Necessity was the 
mother of the blood sports, the necessity to kill for food or self-defence; 
and necessity knows no law. There are no penalizing rules, except 
the game-laws, conditioning the bringing-down of pheasants or the 
catching of salmon. And though the hunting field has its conventions, 
rigid enough, it cannot be doubted that these would disappear should 
expediency demand it; and that in a Leicestershire overrun with foxes as 
Kenya is sometimes overrun with locusts, foxes would be attacked with 
machine-guns worked from motor-cycles with no one, morally, a penny 
the worse for it. 
Compare this with the moral overthrow involved if the rules of the 
highly organized bloodless sports should be tampered with; if the offside 
rule should be discarded by a football team, a superstitious bowler insist 
upon the luck of a seventh throw, or a billiard player consistently pot his 
opponent’s ball. Under such circumstances the moral value of games, so 
much insisted upon by every educationalist, would be utterly lost, and 
cricket would be, indeed, no other than skittles. 
So, having established that, ethically speaking, games are good 
or not good according as to whether they have many or few rules, we 
may proceed to lay down as a first conclusion in this study of Man’s 
Moral Law the axiom that: In any law there is intrinsically a quality of 
goodness; or, to put it more simply: Laws are good in themselves.
 This point of view is not an easy one for women to receive. That a 
law may be a good law, granted; or that the law-abiding are commonly 
considered good, granted again. But that a law, merely by being a law, 
should, irrespective of any other considerations, immediately secrete 
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a quality of absolute goodness, must seem to the female intelligence a 
trifle metaphysical, to put it mildly. Yet, as far as Man’s Moral Law is 
involved, I do not see how the truth of this axiom can he denied. It has 
been arrived at by the strictest reasoning, proceeding from irrefutable 
facts; and the light which it sheds upon many manifestations of 
Man’s Moral Law which must otherwise remain absolutely inexplicable 
establishes it, at any rate to my thinking, as unassailable. 
Moreover, by the acceptance of this axiom we are guided to a 
better understanding of the fact, so strange at first sight, that it is in 
metaphors drawn from games that man expresses his deepest moral 
judgements. For where else among male activities, except perhaps in 
the matter of social drapery, shall we find the arbitrary nature of law 
in such a pure state as in the highly organized games? It is exactly 
because the laws of these games are based upon no apparent reason 
or expediency, and because games themselves are a purely artificial 
contrivance for passing unwanted time that these laws call forth the 
profoundest veneration. 
Further, we may assume that in insisting as they do upon the 
tonic value of organized games our most eminently moral males are in 
truth bent upon insinuating into the minds of the young this very axiom 
that laws are in themselves good and venerable. For the young of the 
human species are apparently quite as devoid of the sense of Moral 
Law as are women of any age; and though it would seem by what we 
know of the taboo system of primitive man that there is in all males a 
natural tendency for the feeling for Moral Law to emerge at or round 
about the age of puberty, our educationalists rightly leave nothing to 
chance, but see to it that by the practice of games this tendency is, as 
it were, schooled and initiated, young males learning, as they learn to 
respect and keep holy various codes of game-playing, the estimable and 
inherently moral quality of laws per se. But women, however well they 
may play games, and however carefully they may observe the rules, 
remain outside the veil. The implicit doctrine is hidden from them, and 
even should they make use of the male metaphors, and say of such and 
such an action that it is not cricket, or that it is all skittles, they speak 
with the lips only, not the heart. This fact is instinctively grasped by 
every man. And it is admirable, in the light of this truth, to observe 
the unflawed tranquillity of the male mind before a growing female 
aptitude for men’s games, and how, with women challenging and 
overcoming them in countless contests of endurance and skill, men can 
still say — and do — with unshaken certainty, that women will never 
be any good at games. 
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Accepting as a basic axiom of Man’s Moral Law that all laws are 
good, it is clear that we must be prepared, in any further exploration 
of this subject, to find a mystical approbation given to qualities which 
in a feminine judgement would be, if approved of at all, approved of 
on grounds of expediency. Indeed, this element of mysticism in Man’s 
Moral Law seems at times to extend almost to fetichism; and if we bear 
in mind how cloistered a life Man’s Moral Law has led through the 
ages, how closely and esoterically guarded from rational criticism, how 
implicitly received and uncompromisingly demonstrated it has been, 
it is not altogether surprising that it should still retain an impress of 
a primitive method of thought. Based, as I believe it to be, upon the 
attribution of a positive quality of goodness to an abstract entity of law, 
Man’s Moral Law appears to be of such a mystical constitution that it can 
still, without awkwardness, anthropomorphize a considerable section of 
the universe which reason considers purely material and inanimate. To 
put this more simply, as primitive man attributed supernatural powers 
to natural objects, and bowed down to wood and stone, man, even now, 
in the privacy of his Moral Law bows down to boots, and sees a possible 
soul of goodness in everything pertaining to himself. 
This cannot be better realized than by a study of the advertise-
ments in our Daily Press which are directed to men, and a comparison 
of these advertisements with those aimed to catch the eye of a woman. 
By such a study it would appear that man will not contemplate 
the purchase of wearing-apparel, shaving-soap, whisky, automobiles, 
purgatives, footwear, or tobacco, unless he be assured that these articles 
are morally satisfactory. 
Here, for an example, are two advertisements, taken at random 
from the Daily Mail of September 16th, 1931. One is male, one is 
female; and any reader of advertisements will see that they are typical 
of their kind, and in no way constitute a special pleading for my point. 
‘Treat them rough,’ the first begins. ‘Wear them day in and day out 
in the foulest muddiest weather on the roughest of roads — these 
boots will “stick it” with dogged steadfast endurance.’ 
Boots, admittedly, should be durable; but so should lipstick. In the 
second advertisement, of a lipstick, the permanence of the particular 
brand is especially stressed. 
‘It holds where others smear and wear — yet leaves no trace of 
greasy residue. It ends that artificial smear that women have 
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tried for years to overcome. A colour that glorifies the lips to 
pulse-quickening loveliness — trust the French for that! On sale 
everywhere in 4 shades.’
It is impossible to imagine an advertisement of lipstick which praised 
its dogged steadfast endurance — as impossible as it is to imagine men 
countenancing a hint of sexual appeal in their boots. Even when the 
same quality is urged in recommendation of a ware, the approach, so to 
speak, is different as chalk from cheese. For women are realists — grim 
realists, as is shown by that painful phrase about the greasy residue. But 
man at all time[s] refers his choice to the implicit idealism of his Moral 
Law, and will buy no article without its sanction. 
Here is another advertisement in which this fact has been so 
completely accepted that the real advantages of the article in question 
are mentioned only to whet by contrast the superior moral allure. 
‘It’s not alone the reasonable first cost or the light fuel- 
consumption — it’s the intrinsic quality of our material, the built-in 
sturdiness … the downright goodness of the car that makes satis-
faction assured.’ 
One would suppose that it was not a car that was recommended 
thus, but a wife for a colonial Bishop—were it not that men, even Bishops, 
sadly aware of female non-morality, abandon, in the choice of a wife, the 
standards by which they choose their pipe tobacco and their underwear.
The mention of underwear occurs here with singular propriety, 
since it leads me on to a further conclusion. This conclusion may seem 
far fetched, perhaps even offensive; but it forces itself upon me, and I 
should not feel justified in omitting it.
I have shown that an essential ingredient, perhaps even the 
mainspring, of Man’s Moral Law can be summed up in the axiom that 
in any law there is intrinsically a quality of goodness; I have shown also 
that this semi-mystical point of view is extended into an attribution of 
moral qualities, such as steadfastness, high-mindedness, etc., to material 
objects not in themselves susceptible to such attributions, and that man 
as a purchaser is greatly influenced by this idealistic notion. No student 
of man can have failed to observe his preference for wearing wool next 
to the skin — a preference so deeply ingrained, so piously put into 
action, and so unconvincingly accounted for by the adduced reasons of 
health and comfort, that there can be no doubt that Moral Law is deeply 
involved in the choice. I have already, though but tentatively, glanced 
at the possibility that Man’s Moral Law may include a certain element of 
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fetichism. In its general outlines it presents some striking resemblances 
to what we know of the taboo system, being, as that is, powerful in its 
effect, rigid in its tradition, and esoterically conveyed to the initiates. 
Moreover, the distance between fetichism and idealism is not so great 
as it may seem; and the peculiar variety of idealism which is exhibited in 
a readiness to attribute ‘downright goodness’ to automobiles might well 
be a rarefied development of the primitive impulse which deifies a tree. 
One of the most persistent traits of fetichist thinking is the belief 
that actual or attributed qualities may be sacramentally transmitted; 
that by drinking the blood of bulls man can become strong, or that the 
wearing of a necklace of tigers’ teeth will bestow ferocity. It is to 
the animal kingdom that man turns for these supernatural transfers, 
feeling here a nearer relationship than with vegetable or mineral 
aspects of matter. Have we not here, then, an explanation of why, at 
the mysterious dictates of his Moral Law, modern man is faithful to 
wool next to the skin? It is true that the sheep is neither a powerful nor 
a sagacious animal; but it is proverbially virtuous; and in these days 
a prudent inoffensiveness has taken the place of the earlier virtues of 
strength and combative ability. In this sense man may truly utter the 
Biblical boast that righteousness is the girdle of his loins. 
It must be noticed that very few animals provide a satisfac-
tory textile. Expense makes the weaving of the lion’s mane out of the 
question, and though both poodles and Persian cats carry coats that 
may be woven up, the poodle is too intelligent to be dignified, and there 
is something about the cat which makes it abhorrent to Man’s Moral 
Law. We are left with the sheep, the goat, and the camel. Goats are 
liable to much the same objections that rule out the cat; but the sheep 
and the camel, animals in their different spheres so closely akin to the 
behaviour-standards of present-day life, animals useful, moderate, and 
enduring, possess exactly the qualifications we might expect to find in 
demand, and are rightly chosen to impress by intimate contact with the 
epidermis their social and moral qualities. 
Whether in actual fact such a transference takes place lies beyond 
the scope of this enquiry. In the light of modern chemistry it seems not 
impossible; but my concern is with Man’s Moral Law, and I must leave 
it to the biologist to determine by observation and experiment if the 
wearing of wool does actually impart a sheepishness to the wearer, or 
if the persistent use of a camel’s-hair dressing-gown results in a notable 
willingness to bear obligations uncomplainingly, and do without drink. 
My part is done if I have succeeded in displaying Man’s Moral Law 
at once preserving the vital beliefs of fetichism and adapting them 
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to modern conditions — a process so intricate and so obscured from 
unsympathetic analysis that we need scarcely wonder that the system 
from which it springs was too much for Kant. Indeed, I must admit that 
in many ways Man’s Moral Law is still too much for me. For example, 
although I am convinced that in the matter of trouser turn-ups we have 
a significant manifestation of its workings, I have not been able to see 
how it works. Phenomena such as these I must leave to other labourers 
in this field, only remarking that they may be compared to the properties 
of amber mentioned in my electrical analogy — seemingly in themselves 
insignificant and undeducible from the full blaze of Moral Law in its 
most direct and forceful manifestations, yet indubitably connected with 
it. And as the early researches into the nature of electricity were most 
profitable when conducted along the humbler lines of investigation, 
I venture to prophesy that the final revelation and understanding of 
Man’s Moral Law will be most swiftly, safely, and surely arrived at by 
such a method as I have here, however modestly, inaugurated — an 
examination of its minor phenomena. Something perhaps parallel to 
the lightning-conductor or the system of insulation will need to be 
invented. Any enquiry by women into so jealously guarded a male 
mystery as Man’s Moral Law is likely to arouse anger and ill-feeling, and 
I am prepared for obloquy. Yet, while enquiry may with justification 
hope for such rich results, it would be weak-minded to hold back; nor, 
on his own showing, has man anything to fear from an impartial inves-
tigation of this subject, claiming as he does, and no doubt rightly, that 
it is by the very possession of a peculiar Moral Law that he is eminent 
among created things, and while following its dictates, infallible in 
judgement and conduct. Accordingly, it is without hesitation, though at 
the risk, maybe, of calling out a temporary resentment, that I venture 
to indicate a line for future research which, in my opinion, is likely 
to yield most valuable results. In this short essay I have succeeded in 
carrying back Man’s Moral Law to primitive man. Such an antiquity is 
respectable enough; yet I believe that research should be carried a step 
further; and it is with confidence that I recommend to those who may 
come after me a patient enquiry into the conduct of baboons. 
Note
* 1893–1978.
1 Dante, Inferno, Canto III, line 51. ‘Let us 
not speak of them. Look, then pass on’ 
(tr. Robin Kirkpatrick).
